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The Distributional Effects of Devolution in the U.S. Welfare Reform 
 
Luis Ayala,1 Elena Bárcena-Martín2 and Jorge Martínez-Vázquez3 
December 2020 
Abstract 
The passage of the PRWORA in 1996 devolved responsibility for the design of 
welfare programs from the federal to state governments in the U.S. Some of the 
strategies implemented to achieve the main goals of the reform –promoting higher 
levels of labor participation and decreasing levels of welfare dependency– might 
have had the effects of reducing the protection received by the most vulnerable 
households and increasing differences in benefit levels across states. We estimate 
these effects using TANF data covering the two decades after the PRWORA's 
enactment. We measure the contribution of each state to inequality in adequacy 
rates. We provide an interpretation of the decomposition of the change in inequality 
in adequacy rates in terms of progressivity and re-ranking components, and we 
analyze the convergence in TANF adequacy rates. We also estimate the conditional 
convergence of adequacy ratios with respect to the change in labor participation, 
poverty rates, and caseloads. We find that differences in adequacy rates increased 
and that a downward divergence path took place ensuing devolution of welfare 
reform in the U.S. 
Keywords: TANF, devolution, inequality, adequacy rates 
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The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA) devolved responsibility for the design and implementation of welfare programs 
from the federal to state governments in the U.S. The motivation was to prompt states to create 
effective and innovative programs in order to promote higher levels of labor participation and 
decreasing levels of welfare dependency. As states were given more capacity to design their 
programs, the reform produced some kind of ‘laboratories of democracy’, using the phrase 
popularized by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis.  
Two decades later, considerable evidence has accumulated showing that in the process of welfare 
reform state and local governments have followed differing strategies and ended enacting very 
different programs. We have also learned that some states and localities have been more 
responsive to the new framework than others as they have taken more advantage of the 
opportunity to change the design of the programs. This diverse response became more evident 
with the Great Recession, renewing discussion about the potential social welfare costs in terms 
of the resulting differences in benefit levels across states. While the success of the programs 
should be measured mainly according to their initial objectives –promoting higher levels of labor 
participation and decreasing levels of welfare dependency– some of the strategies implemented 
might have had the effect of severely reducing the protection received by the most vulnerable 
households in some states. Inequality arising from the increasing differences of cash benefit 
levels across states has been also perceived as an additional distributional concern with potential 
welfare implications.  
There are several avenues through which PRWORA can potentially increase differences in 




complying with three federal requirements: fostering labor transitions through work 
requirements, imposing sanctions to those who fail to comply with the work requirements, and 
setting time limits on the receipt of benefits. States can also modify eligibility requirements, 
including asset and earnings disregards. Additionally, states have the ability to choose the 
intensity of benefits provided through the program.  
A key issue is whether this increase in discretion for state governments has led to more generous 
welfare programs providing better protection or, in contrast, to more punitive welfare programs 
that offer lower level of benefits, stringer eligibility criteria and more restrictive work 
requirements. A second, less investigated, set of issues is whether decentralization has given rise 
to a substantial divergence in the level of benefits across states and what are the distributional 
consequences of this process. An important concern is whether higher levels of labor 
participation and decreasing levels of welfare dependency might have been obtained at the same 
time that benefits became lower and distributed more unequally across states.  
These potential outcomes may have relevant implications in terms of inequality. First, higher 
adequacy in welfare benefits can be crucial to improve the situation of the most disadvantaged 
households and to some extent can represent the gains in social welfare resulting from public 
intervention. Some previous studies have proposed social welfare indices characterized in terms 
of the level of welfare embodied in a given distribution of adequacy rates (Ayala and Bárcena-
Martín, 2018). Second, other studies looking at variation in the decentralized social safety net 
have found that it fosters new forms and dimensions of inequality and have used inequality 
indicators to measure these differences (Bruch et al., 2016; Meni and Wiseman, 2017). 
Unevenness across states in adequacy rates have important distributional consequences for 




provides to a certain extent an overall judgement of social welfare in a given country or region, 
we can look at the distribution of adequacy rates across states in a similar way to the standard 
analysis of inequality. According to the intensive literature on abbreviated social welfare 
functions (Sen, 1973; Chakravarty, 2009), a lower mean –in this case decreasing adequacy rates– 
and higher inequality –larger differences across states– yield lower levels of social welfare. In 
this way, social welfare does not only depend on the level of adequacy in each state but also on 
differences across states.  
Decentralization might also give rise to a ‘race to the bottom’ with lower benefit levels and 
higher differences across states (Peterson and Rom, 1989; Shroder, 1995; Rom et al., 1998; 
Figlio et al., 1999; Brueckner, 2000; Saavedra, 2000; Berry et al., 2003; Bailey and Rom, 2004; 
Baicker, 2005a, b), and, as a consequence, lead to considerable welfare under-provision 
(Gramlich et al., 1982; Brown and Oates, 1987; Wheaton, 2000; McKinnish, 2005; Toolsema 
and Allers, 2014). While the evidence is somewhat mixed regarding the size and causes of the 
‘race to the bottom’ effect, most studies confirm it. The empirical importance of such differences 
across jurisdictions has also been addressed in studies of some European countries with 
decentralized welfare related policies, such as personal social services in the UK (Revelli, 2006), 
local welfare benefits in Norway (Fiva and Rattsø, 2006), and the refugee placement program in 
Sweden (Dahlberg and Edmark, 2008).  
As the evidence on lower benefits in real terms with respect to the levels before the reform in 
many states is increasingly robust, there has been renewed academic discussion over how a more 
decentralized system of welfare provision can lead to higher differences in welfare levels across 
states. As stressed by Chernick (2000), if more fiscal responsibility for redistribution is left to 




redistribution might choose benefits and levels of access that fall below some supposed 
minimum national standards of adequacy.  
In the assessment of the 1996 welfare reform, a key issue is whether the federal government 
should have set up explicit distributional constraints on the process of maximizing labor 
participation and reducing caseloads. Therefore, a question commonly asked in the literature has 
been whether the different intensity across states in the trend of decreasing benefits has produced 
important inequalities in the protection provided by the program. Our paper enters at this point. 
We use some of the tools of the income distribution literature to evaluate the long-term results of 
the reform in terms of the differences in benefit levels across states in the Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) program.1 We try to give an answer to questions such as how 
different are in fact state TANF adequacy levels or how have state TANF adequacy levels 
changed over time. While we are not the first to study both the decreasing trend in benefit levels 
in welfare programs in the US and the extent of differences across states, our work differs from 
most of the previous literature in that we analyze these differences using a distributional 
approach.2  
Using data covering the two decades after the PRWORA's enactment we contribute to the 
development of a more comprehensive picture of the effects of PRWORA by analyzing how 
TANF adequacy ratios have evolved across time and how the relative level of adequacy of each 
state with respect to other states has changed. With this purpose we measure the contribution of 
each state to inequality in adequacy rates making use of the Gini index and interpreting this 
                                                 
1 PRWORA instituted the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, which became effective July 1, 1997. 
TANF replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program—which had been in effect since 1935—and 
supplanted the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training program (JOBS) of 1988. 
2 A notable exception that uses a distributive approach to look at the dimensions and consequences of the decentralization of 




inequality measure in terms of deprivation. Second, using a dynamic perspective we evaluate the 
change in inequality and decompose it in changes in relative and absolute levels of adequacy 
following Silber (1995) and Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006). Third, we analyze convergence in 
adequacy levels under the unified framework proposed by Donghde and Silber (2016).   
We find that differences in inequality levels across states increased and that a general process of 
degradation in the adequacy of these cash benefits took place during the time period under study. 
Besides adding new robust measures for both processes, we are first to provide new results 
identifying which states have contributed most to inequality. We also find that despite the lower 
reduction of benefits in states with initial lower benefit levels, this progressive decline was not 
translated into convergence in benefit levels due to large re-rankings between states. Using 
conditional convergence, our results also confirm that while there were clear gains in terms of 
labor participation, the adequacy of benefits decreased and, at the same time, differences across 
states increased. Although our aim is not to establish causality—given that there might be other 
confounding factors that we do not control for such as, interstate migration or changes in the 
business cycle over the 20 years our analysis covers—, our findings do add these two specific 
results to the broad set of outcomes of devolution to the states.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief summary of the 
main trends in benefit levels since the enactment of the reform. In section three we measure 
inequality in adequacy rates and identify the contribution of each state to total inequality. Section 
four decomposes the change in inequality in adequacy rates in terms of progressivity and re-
rankings. In section five we analyze the issues of pro-poor growth and convergence through 
different measures. In section six we estimate the convergence of adequacy ratios with respect to 




2. Trends in TANF Benefits  
In 1996, the federal government passed legislation that transformed welfare provision in the US. 
The PRWORA replaced AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) program, which was 
a federal entitlement program providing federal funds to match states' expenditures on welfare 
programs, with TANF. The latter is a block grant that caps the dollar amount of federal funds to 
the states regardless of increases in case size. The introduction of TANF made state expenditures 
on cash benefits no longer subsidized at the margin (Marton and Wildasin, 2007). Although we 
only focus here on benefit levels, states can use TANF funds beyond the core areas of providing 
cash assistance and promoting work. Specifically, states can use TANF funds for a variety of 
services and support including: cash assistance, child care, education and job training, 
transportation, aid to children at risk of abuse and neglect, and a variety of other services to help 
low-income families.  
Nationally, only about a quarter of TANF spending is on cash assistance, but states differ widely 
in their allocation of TANF dollars across cash and other categories.3 The states allocating a 
higher percentage of their TANF grant funds toward cash assistance are more likely to have 
supplemental minimum wages and lower unemployment rates, they are also ideologically more 
liberal, with a noticeably lower proportion of blacks residing in the state and a lower proportion 
of blacks on the TANF caseload (Hardy et al., 2019). 
The new system of block grants gave states more capacity to select among policy parameters, but 
simultaneously imposing on them forceful mandates to promote work and reduce welfare 
                                                 





dependency.4 To qualify for TANF funds, states must comply with three federal requirements: i) 
state programs must emphasize work requirements to promote transitions from welfare to work; 
ii) state programs must include sanctions for reducing benefits to recipients who do not comply 
with the work requirements; iii) state programs must impose a five-year lifetime cap on receipt 
of benefits. As states responded to this new federal framework, their policy changes focused less 
on the amounts of reliefs offered than on the terms on which aid was given (Soss et al., 2001; De 
Jong et al., 2006).  
Nevertheless, under the new framework, states have the ability to choose the intensity of benefits 
provided through their programs. Until the introduction of PRWORA, the states received the 
same federal match for their welfare spending regardless of whether this came from increased 
spending per recipient or the increased number of recipients. AFDC was jointly financed, with 
the federal matching rate depending on state income and with no cap on total expenditures. Quite 
the opposite, TANF is essentially a block grant, with a matching rate of 0 percent. Different 
authors have estimated the elasticities of benefit levels and caseloads with respect to federal 
subsidies (Chernick, 1998; Ribar and Wilhelm, 1999). The most robust results show that while 
states faced a marginal price (for both benefits and recipients) of around 40 cents on the dollar on 
average in 1995, TANF increased the price of either kind of spending to 1, representing an 
increase in both price margins of 120% (Baicker, 2005a).  
It was not surprising then to predict that states with higher caseload-to-population ratios under 
AFDC in 1996 were going to adopt more restrictive policies under TANF system, including 
                                                 
4 To avoid an excessive reduction in welfare spending, TANF has a maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement under which states 
must spend at least 75 percent of the amount that they did prior to the welfare reform on benefits and services for members of 
needy families each year. Because of inflation, the real values of the federal block grants and the state MOE requirements have 




lower benefit levels. In general terms, PRWORA was a break from previous trends of welfare 
spending in the United States, which had grown both in absolute terms and as a percentage of 
GDP monotonically for 30 years prior to reaching an all-time high in 1994 (Moffitt, 1999). There 
is substantial evidence of a sharp decline in welfare caseloads since TANF was enacted in 1996. 
The first years after the PRWORA's enactment were marked by unprecedented drops in the 
number of families receiving cash assistance. The number of recipients dropped more than sixty 
per cent between 1994 and 2001 and continued to decrease in later years before slowing down 
and reversing slightly when the Great Recession began in 2008 (Weaver, 2014). In a number of 
states, TANF provides cash assistance to a much smaller share of poor families than the national 
data suggests. Most of the states that experienced a greater degree of caseload decline were those 
that engaged in second-order devolution –which allows local governments to exercise more 
discretion in the implementation of TANF (Kim and Fording, 2010).  
According to these numbers, TANF has provided basic cash assistance to fewer needy families 
even when economic needs greatly increased, especially with the start of the Great Recession. 
The vast majority of states had declines in cash assistance during a very weak economic period, 
in sharp contrast to the huge increase in food stamp usage (Ziliak, 2016). There is also evidence 
showing that caseloads seem to have been less responsive to unemployment changes than they 
were twenty years ago. Using data on state caseloads from 1980-2009 and interacting 
unemployment rates and measures of welfare reform, Bitler and Hoynes (2010) found that the 
substantial changes implemented in welfare programs in the US during the nineties caused a 
decrease in the cyclicality of cash welfare. The available evidence also suggests that the lack of 
increase in caseloads is explained almost entirely by declines in take-up rather than declines in 




lack of responsiveness of TANF to the Great Recession extending the data through 2012, and as 
a consequence extreme poverty became more cyclical than in past recessions.   
Relatively less is known about the changes in benefit levels. Table A1 in the online appendix 
presents benefit levels for a family of three for 1996, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2016 (using three-
year moving averages) adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics). 5 The purchasing value of benefits has fallen in most states. While differences among 
states are substantial, the amount of cash assistance has declined in inflation-adjusted terms since 
1996 in almost every state –the exceptions are Wyoming, Maryland and Texas. Many states did 
not adjust benefits, allowing inflation to erode the benefits’ real value. The mean moving average 
states’ benefit level measured in constant terms dropped 24.85% in twenty years from $388 in 
1996 to $292 in 2016. If the analysis is extended in time moving to AFDC data before the 
implementation of TANF in 1996, the real benefit declined from 24 to upwards of 70 percent 
between 1970 and 2012, and for the median state it fell by 51 percent (Ziliak, 2016). These 
changes in the level of benefits imply that if we only look at TANF benefits many families are 
more vulnerable financially today than decades ago.  
Benefit levels vary substantially among states. For each year, the benefits in the five states with 
the highest benefits more than triple the benefits in the five lowest benefit states. In 2016, in the 
former group were Alaska, New York, California, Wisconsin, and New Hampshire; these states 
were also among the ten states with the highest benefits in 1996. At the bottom of the ranking are 
Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Alabama, and Louisiana, which were also among the seven 
states with the lowest benefits twenty years ago. Nevertheless, with the exception of the upper 
                                                 
5 Moving average data for 1996-1998 is named 1996, for 1999-2001 is named 2000, for 2004-2006 is named 2005, for 2009-




and lower tails of the states’ distribution, the corresponding rankings of benefit levels are not 
constant. While some states have a similar position each year, there have been some remarkable 
re-rankings. When comparing the current ranking and that of 1996, thirteen states made jumps of 
five or more places. In general terms, the reduction of benefit levels in real terms was remarkably 
higher in the five states with the highest benefits than in the three states with the lowest ones.   
A general approach to assess the economic sufficiency of the programs is to compare benefit 
levels with poverty lines. First, poverty alleviation is a primary objective of welfare benefits in 
most OECD countries, and when comparing benefit generosity across countries or states a useful 
starting point is to look at benefit levels relative to commonly-used poverty thresholds 
(Immervol, 2010). Second, as stressed by Cancian and Meyer (2004), poverty status remains a 
key measure of success for a number of reasons: the official poverty threshold is a standard, 
well-known measure of the sufficiency of economic resources, program eligibility is sometimes 
defined by poverty status, and, relative to measures of hardship, poverty status should be less 
sensitive to consumption choices and coping mechanisms that may reduce hardship but leave a 
family vulnerable. 
For each state, the level of benefit for a family of three is compared to the official poverty line 
calculated by the Census Bureau.6 Alternatively, we have adjusted the benefits of each state with 
the cost of living for years for which SARPP Regional Price Parities by state are available (2008 
onwards). Only for around 10% of the states the variation is greater than 10% and the orderings 
                                                 
6 The family of three is the size closer to the average number of persons in TANF families when the reform was implemented. 
The level of benefit for Alaska and Hawaii, where the cost of living is traditionally believed to be significantly higher than in 
other states, scaling factors of 1.25 and 1.15, respectively, are applied to the guideline for a family or household of three for the 




are quite similar (with very little change in the states that are within the first ten or last ten 
positions of the ranking). 
An alternative to the official poverty line is the new Supplemental Poverty Thresholds (SPM). 
These measure do take geographical differences in prices into account and the ranking of states 
by adequacy or benefit level generosity might be different. However, the earliest thresholds are 
for 2005 and to get back to 1996 it is necessary to make some strict assumptions (Fox et al., 
2015). Anyway, we have compared the results for 2016 using both the official poverty lines and 
the SPM and we find very similar rankings. Eight of the ten states with the highest rates in 2016 
are the same with both thresholds; and we also find the same number in the case of the ten states 
with the lowest rates. 
















Alabama 14.8 13.8 16.0 14.0 12.9 -12.8 
Alaska 66.5 62.3 55.0 48.2 44.3 -33.5 
Arizona 31.3 29.3 25.8 18.1 16.6 -46.8 
Arkansas 18.4 17.2 15.2 13.3 12.2 -33.5 
California 55.8 59.6 58.5 49.3 44.8 -19.7 
Colorado 32.2 30.1 26.5 30.2 27.7 -13.9 
Connecticut 48.9 45.8 40.4 36.9 35.4 -27.7 
Delaware 30.5 28.5 25.2 23.8 20.3 -33.5 
D.C. 35.3 32.0 28.9 27.9 26.0 -26.2 
Florida 27.3 25.6 22.6 19.8 18.2 -33.5 
Georgia 25.2 23.6 20.9 18.3 16.8 -33.5 
Hawaii 48.5 41.8 36.9 35.1 31.8 -34.4 
Idaho 26.1 24.2 23.0 20.2 18.5 -29.1 
Illinois 34.0 31.8 29.5 28.2 25.9 -23.8 
Indiana 26.0 24.3 21.5 18.8 17.3 -33.5 
Iowa 38.4 36.0 31.7 27.8 25.5 -33.5 
Kansas 38.7 36.2 32.0 28.0 25.7 -33.5 
Kentucky 23.6 22.1 19.5 17.1 15.7 -33.5 




Maine 37.7 38.9 36.1 31.7 29.1 -22.8 
Maryland 34.2 35.3 36.0 37.5 37.9 10.9 
Massachusetts 52.2 51.1 46.0 40.3 37.7 -27.8 
Michigan 41.4 38.8 34.9 32.1 29.5 -28.7 
Minnesota 47.9 44.9 39.6 34.7 31.9 -33.5 
Mississippi 10.8 14.4 12.7 11.1 10.2 -5.7 
Missouri 26.3 24.7 21.7 19.1 17.5 -33.5 
Montana 39.4 40.5 29.5 32.9 33.6 -14.7 
Nebraska 37.8 35.7 27.1 23.8 23.3 -38.5 
Nevada 31.4 29.4 25.9 25.0 23.0 -26.8 
New Hampshire 49.6 49.2 46.6 44.1 40.5 -18.3 
New Jersey 38.2 35.8 31.6 27.7 25.4 -33.5 
New Mexico 38.0 37.1 29.0 27.7 23.4 -38.5 
New York 52.0 48.7 51.5 49.2 47.3 -9.0 
North Carolina 24.5 23.0 20.3 17.8 16.3 -33.5 
North Dakota 39.6 39.1 35.5 30.1 29.0 -26.9 
Ohio 31.3 31.2 28.7 28.3 28.2 -10.0 
Oklahoma 27.2 24.7 21.7 19.1 17.5 -35.7 
Oregon 44.0 42.5 37.7 33.7 30.3 -31.1 
Pennsylvania 36.3 34.0 30.0 26.3 24.2 -33.5 
Rhode Island 49.9 46.8 41.3 36.2 33.2 -33.5 
South Carolina 18.1 17.1 17.0 16.5 16.6 -7.8 
South Dakota 38.8 36.3 37.7 35.9 36.2 -6.5 
Tennessee 16.7 15.6 13.8 12.1 11.1 -33.5 
Texas 16.9 16.6 16.5 16.7 16.8 -0.6 
Utah 39.1 38.7 35.3 32.0 29.9 -23.7 
Vermont 54.6 52.7 47.7 41.8 38.4 -29.7 
Virginia 26.2 26.2 23.8 20.9 22.3 -14.9 
Washington 49.2 46.1 40.7 34.9 30.4 -38.3 
West Virginia 22.8 31.1 28.2 22.2 20.4 -10.6 
Wisconsin 55.9 56.8 50.1 43.9 39.2 -29.9 
Wyoming 31.3 28.7 25.3 36.6 38.5 23.1 
Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and Health and Human Services Department. 
 
The picture of states and ratios considering benefits as a proportion of the federal poverty line is 
very similar to the previous analysis of inflation-updated benefits. The mean moving average 
states’ adequacy rate dropped from 35.3 in 1996 to 26.2 in 2016. In more than two-thirds of the 




escaping this decreasing trend were Maryland and Wyoming, where the level of benefits as a 
proportion of the poverty threshold increased more than 10 per cent.  
Again, the differences are striking between the states with the highest ratios (over 40 per cent): 
New York, California, Alaska, New Hampshire and Wisconsin, and the states with the lowest 
ratios (below 15 percent): Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Mississippi. However, 
it seems that there is not a linear relationship between the reduction of the ratio and its initial 
level. In general terms, the reduction of benefits as a proportion of the poverty threshold was 
somewhat lower in the states that had the lowest ratios in the mid-nineties and the opposite 
occurred in case of the most generous states. However, there are important re-rankings –yet less 
relevant than in the case of absolute benefit rankings.  
In short, both measures of benefit levels across states show that the protection provided by 
TANF has eroded in most states, leaving more families without sufficient income resources to 
meet their basic needs.7 The large differences observed in the treatment given to poor households 
(in identical conditions) in different geographic areas of the country are a source of inequality. In 
this sense, the increasing decentralization of welfare benefits implied by TANF has given rise to 
a problem of horizontal inequity. This latter problem lies at the heart of any discussion on the 
welfare consequences of devolving to the states broader discretion and responsibilities to 
determine antipoverty policies. 
                                                 
7 We could have used AFDC + Food Stamps or TANF+SNAP instead of only TANF. SNAP provides similar benefit levels 
nationally so it tends to smooth state differences a bit. We have replicated the analysis for 1996 and 2016 using TANF+SNAP 
instead of TANF and, even though adequacy rates are greater, the states rankings do not change significantly (Spearman rank 
correlation is 0.978 for 1996 and 0.992 for 2016, and the coefficients of correlation are 0.980 and 0.993, respectively) and our 




3. States Contributions to Inequality in Adequacy Rates  
By considering the adequacy rate as a measure of the protection provided by each program is 
possible to use traditional indicators of inequality to summarize differences in the protection 
provided. We analyze between states inequality in adequacy levels with the Gini index. We take 
the state as the unit of observation —after all, it is the states that are the decision makers—, look 
at its adequacy level, and thus compare the rates. Note that this is properly a measure of between 
states inequality, since it compares states. It is “unweighted” because it is not intended to be a 
measure of inequality among citizens of USA, thus each state counts the same.  
We take advantage of the interpretation of the Gini index of inequality in terms of relative 
deprivation to account for the contribution of each state to overall inequality. Relative deprivation 
allows to evaluate the level of adequacy of one state against the level of adequacy of other states 
in the U.S., which are taken as a sort of a benchmark. Relative deprivation refers to the situation 
of a single state, while inequality refers to the set of states as a whole. The desirability of obtaining 
indicators of relative achievements at the state level motivates the study of the contribution of each 
state to overall inequality through the relative deprivation analysis.  
Let us assume a fixed homogeneous population N= {l, 2, . . . , n} of n (n≥2) jurisdictions that in 
our framework are states that differ in the outcome of interest (adequacy rates). A feasible 
distribution Y is given by an outcome vector (𝑦1, 𝑦2, . . . , 𝑦𝑛)  ∈ 𝑹
𝑛 where 𝑦𝑖 is state i’s 
adequacy, 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛, 𝑦1 ≤ 𝑦2 ≤. . . ≤ 𝑦𝑛 and 𝜇 is the mean adequacy. The deprivation, 
𝐼𝐷(𝑦𝑖, 𝑦𝑗), of a state with adequacy 𝑦𝑖 with respect to other state with adequacy 𝑦𝑗, where 𝑦𝑗 ≥
𝑦𝑖, can be considered to be the adequacy differential (Hey and Lambert, 1980). . That is, 
𝐼𝐷(𝑦𝑖, 𝑦𝑗) = {
𝑦𝑗 − 𝑦𝑖  𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑗 ≥ 𝑦𝑖
0             𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑗 < 𝑦𝑖.
 [1] 

























𝑖=1 = 𝜇𝐺,            [3] 
where 𝐺 is the Gini index. As we want to analyse relative inequality, we will compute 
deprivation in relative terms respect to the mean of the whole set of jurisdictions. 




.     [4]  
Table 2. States Contribution to Inequality in Adequacy Rates and Gini Coefficient 
State 1996 2000 2005 2010 2016 
Alabama 5.74 5.89 4.72 4.90 4.90 
Alaska 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 
Arizona 2.01 2.16 2.25 3.64 3.68 
Arkansas 4.80 4.95 4.98 5.13 5.14 
California 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Colorado 1.87 2.02 2.14 1.10 1.20 
Connecticut 0.25 0.35 0.46 0.40 0.36 
D.C. 1.40 1.71 1.60 1.45 1.48 
Delaware 2.15 2.32 2.40 2.28 2.71 
Florida 2.75 2.90 2.97 3.20 3.24 
Georgia 3.18 3.34 3.40 3.59 3.62 
Hawaii 0.27 0.60 0.71 0.53 0.67 
Idaho 2.99 3.20 2.87 3.10 3.16 
Illinois 1.59 1.74 1.62 1.40 1.50 
Indiana 3.01 3.18 3.24 3.45 3.48 
Iowa 1.00 1.13 1.29 1.47 1.57 
Kansas 0.97 1.11 1.26 1.43 1.53 
Kentucky 3.55 3.71 3.75 3.93 3.97 
Louisiana 5.12 4.54 4.20 4.36 4.40 
Maine 1.08 0.83 0.79 0.90 0.99 
Maryland 1.56 1.22 0.64 0.37 0.20 
Massachusetts 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.23 0.21 




Minnesota 0.31 0.40 0.51 0.57 0.66 
Mississippi 6.83 5.72 5.74 5.87 5.85 
Missouri 2.95 3.09 3.16 3.37 3.43 
Montana 0.90 0.70 1.26 0.76 0.50 
Nebraska 1.07 1.17 2.03 2.28 2.01 
Nevada 1.99 2.15 2.25 2.03 2.08 
New Hampshire 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.10 0.11 
New Jersey 1.02 1.16 1.32 1.49 1.59 
New Mexico 1.04 1.01 1.70 1.49 1.99 
New York 0.14 0.23 0.07 0.00 0.00 
North Carolina 3.34 3.49 3.53 3.73 3.78 
North Dakota 0.89 0.81 0.84 1.12 1.00 
Ohio 2.01 1.83 1.60 1.39 1.12 
Oklahoma 2.77 3.09 3.16 3.37 3.43 
Oregon 0.56 0.55 0.62 0.67 0.83 
Pennsylvania 1.27 1.41 1.54 1.76 1.83 
Rhode Island 0.21 0.30 0.42 0.45 0.54 
South Carolina 4.87 4.97 4.20 4.11 3.68 
South Dakota 0.96 1.10 0.63 0.47 0.31 
Tennessee 5.23 5.38 5.39 5.53 5.53 
Texas 5.18 5.11 4.47 4.05 3.62 
Utah 0.93 0.84 0.88 0.86 0.88 
Vermont 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.17 
Virginia 2.97 2.78 2.69 2.93 2.24 
Washington 0.24 0.33 0.44 0.55 0.82 
West Virginia 3.74 1.85 2.36 2.63 2.69 
Wisconsin 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.14 
Wyoming 2.01 2.28 2.36 0.42 0.17 
Gini index  0.199 0.198 0.201 0.202 0.205 
 
Table 2 shows the Gini indexes for adequacy rates in 1996, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2016 using 
three-year moving averages, and the corresponding contribution of each state to overall 
inequality in adequacy rates.  The former information allows us to broaden and deepen the 
analysis of adequacy rates, since we consider not only the level but also the dispersion by 
evaluating the relative mean distance among states. Inequality in adequacy rates slightly 
increased (3% increase) from 1996 to 2016, showing that relative mean differences in adequacy 




(2016) with a different indicator of adequacy –total benefit spending divided by a state’s average 
or total caseload. Although this result cannot be interpreted as causal evidence, it seems that 
since the mid-nineties –when the reform was enacted– inequality across states increased. In fact, 
the Gini index for AFDC/TANF benefit levels –University of Kentucky Center for Poverty 
Research (UKCPR) National Welfare Data– shows that while between the mid-1980s and the 
1990s these differences decreased, in the subsequent period following devolution they increased, 
especially in the most recent years. 
We simultaneously observe changes in the contribution of the states to overall inequality in 
adequacy rates showing that the distance with respect to states with greater adequacy rates were 
not the same from one year to the next. Alaska was the state with the highest adequacy rate in 
1996 and 2000, and therefore contributes 0 to inequality, while California and New York played 
the same role in 2010 and New York alone in 2016. On the other extreme, we find Alabama and 
Mississippi in 1996 and 2000, and Mississippi and Tennessee in the remaining years.  
Contributions to inequality were not stable along this time span. Washington and Rhode Island 
had the largest increases in contributions during 1996-2016. This means that these states 
increased their relative mean distance to the other states during this period of time. At the other 
extreme, New York, Wyoming and Maryland showed the largest reductions in contributions. 
Furthermore, in the cases of Maryland the contribution continuously decreased along these years.  
In short, not surprisingly, once the devolution process of 1996 got started, inequality in adequacy 
rates increased. Given also that benefit levels as percentage of federal poverty threshold fell in 
most states, we can then conclude that if the evaluation of the reform were made exclusively in 
distributional terms, PRWORA yielded some identifiable well-being losses. In practice, 




the improvements in labor participation rates –which, in any case, cannot be attributed only to 
PRWORA but also to the strong macroeconomic expansion of the 1990s, as well as SNAP and 
EITC policy expansions (Gundersen and Ziliak, 2004), and overall lower welfare dependency. 
4. Inequality, Progressivity and Re-Rankings in TANF Benefits 
The dispersion observed in the adequacy rates has changed over time. This change can be due to 
a variation in the values of states’ adequacy rates or to the variation in the relative position of the 
states in terms of adequacy rates.  The two types of changes may not be independent since, for 
instance, a large increase in the rates will often be associated with an increase in rank, but it is 
informative to know which of the two changes is more relevant.  
This differentiation does not only have academic interest. In the political sphere, in line with the 
models of yardstick competition, voters use information on public policies in the other 
jurisdictions as a yardstick in the assessment of their own government’s policies (Besley and 
Case, 1995). In this sense, the changes in the relative performance of states are important not 
only because of their contribution to inequality but potentially also as a basis for individual 
decision making on voting, adding to their sense of economic security, and thus to their overall 
well-being.  
Following Silber (1995) and Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006), we model the change in the Gini 
index of adequacy rates between some base year (0) and final year (1) for a fixed number of 
states.8 Letting Gt denote the Gini index for year t, the change in this measure can be written as 
∆𝐺 = 𝐺1 − 𝐺0. [5] 
                                                 
8 Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) draw upon individual-level data. Even though ours may be a strong assumption, we also consider 




When the change in inequality is measured through the Gini index, an assumption of anonymity 
is made. It is not known whether the states had the same rank at time 0 and at time 1. In this 
section we delve into the analysis of the changes in the adequacy rates over time and decompose 
them into two components: one related to the changes in the states’ adequacy rate and a second 
component related to the changes in their relative position in the corresponding distribution.  
The change in inequality can be decomposed into two terms: V, summarizing progressivity (i.e. 
whether adequacy rates growth is greater in states with lower adequacy rates than in states with 
higher rates), and 𝑅, summarizing the re-ranking of states from the initial to the final year: 
∆𝐺 = 𝑅 − 𝑉      [6] 
When every state experiences an equi-proportionate growth in the adequacy rate, V=0. When 
µ1>µo, 𝜇𝑡 being the mean adequacy mean adequacy at time 𝑡, and there is no equi-proportionate 
growth but it is more concentrated at the bottom of the distribution, V>0. This can be considered 
a pro-poor growth in adequacy rates (progressivity). By contrast, if gains are more than 
proportionally concentrated among states with higher adequacy rates, V<0. This would be the 
case of non-pro-poor growth in adequacy rates (regressivity). The opposite occurs when µ1<µo. 
The coefficient R summarizes the change in inequality due to reorderings of states from the 











in mean ∆G V R 
1996-2016 -0.255 0.006 0.014 0.020 
1996-2000 -0.035 -0.001 0.004 0.003 
2000-2005 -0.097 0.003 0.001 0.004 
2005-2010 -0.085 0.001 0.007 0.008 
2010-2016 -0.065 0.003 -0.002 0.001 
Note: ∆G: change in Gini coefficient, V: pro-poor growth; R: re-
ranking from the initial to final year.   
 
Mean adequacy rates fell during the period 1996-2016, and the progressivity index has a positive 
sign (V>0) showing that the average reduction of adequacy rates was greater for states with 
higher adequacy rates (Table 3). 9 During 1996-2000 there was a progressive reduction in 
adequacy rates that was partially counterbalanced by re-rankings, all resulting in a scant 
reduction in inequality. In the period 2000-2005 inequality growth stemmed mostly from re-
rankings. Inequality scarcely increased in the period 2005-2010, but progressivity and re-
rankings were high, in such a way that the progressive reduction in adequacy rates was totally 
counterbalanced by changes in relative positions.  Finally, the period 2010-2016 is the only one 
with a non-progressive reduction in adequacy rates that was reinforced by re-rankings resulting 
in the greatest increase of inequality in adequacy rates. In general terms, we can conclude that 
the reduction in adequacy was greater in those with higher adequacy rates in 1996, placing some 
of them at lower adequacy rates than those of the states with the lowest initial levels.  
                                                 
9 The analysis was repeated using the generalized Gini coefficient (Donaldson and Weymark, 1980, 1983; Yitzhaki, 1983) for 
values of the inequality-aversion parameter between 1.5 and 4 (that give more weight to lower adequacy rates). As the general 
conclusions were the same for each case, we report results only for the Gini coefficient (parameter 2). Results for the other 




The decomposition analysis above therefore gives general support to the notion that the 
differences in adequacy rates increased mainly as the result of the changes in the positions of the 
states in the ranking of adequacy rates.   
5. Inequality and Convergence in Benefit Levels  
The previous analyses of inequality in benefit levels and the corresponding contributions of the 
different states to overall inequality help to confirm the increasing differences in adequacy rates 
across states. 
A second and important issue that can be addressed using a distributional approach is whether or 
not devolution also yielded a ‘race to the bottom’ process. Given that benefit levels became 
lower in most states and that differences across states have become larger today than two 
decades ago, it can be expected that this process has been one of the long-term results of the 
reform. The issue of the relationship between the change in adequacy rates and how these 
changes are distributed among states is central in considering whether these changes gave rise to 
increasing or decreasing levels of convergence.  
In order to identify the welfare gains associated with inequality and convergence in adequacy 
rates, first we make use of a graphical tool, the well-known Growth Incidence Curves (GIC) 
introduced by Ravallion and Chen (2003). The GIC captures the growth rate of a variable for 
every percentile of the distribution between two points in time. With the GIC we measure the 
growth of a given percentile, not a given state. We consider only a quantile, without knowing the 
identity of its participants. The GIC initially was formulated to measure whether growth in the 
lower quantiles is higher than in the mean income of the other quantiles, but it was soon 
extended in a variety of ways. Grimm (2007) applied these curves to the non-anonymous case 




quantiles of the initial distribution) and referred to it as the Individual Growth Incidence Curve 
(IGIC). In addition, Grosse et al. (2008) used these curves to examine whether growth in a given 
variable (non-income dimension) was greater for lower centiles by defining the Non-Income 
Growth Incidence Curve (NIGIC). We make use of the NIGIC –in its Anonymous and Non-
Anonymous version– to obtain a graphical analysis of the distribution of growth in adequacy 
rates.  
In the non-anonymous case, we arrange the states by increasing order of adequacy level in the 
initial year, t − 1, and compute the change in adequacy rates  for the same state at two periods, t 




) − 1,    [7] 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 refer to the adequacy rate of state 𝑖 at times 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1 in a population of 𝑛 
states. If  𝑔𝑖𝑡 is a decreasing function for all 𝑖, then inequality falls over time for all inequality 
measures. 
In the anonymous case, we arrange the states by increasing order of adequacy level in the initial 
year, t − 1, and also in the final year, t, and compute the growth rates for those states  in the 
same position in t − 1 and in t. Note that states do not need to be in the same position in both 
points in time. The anonymous-NIGIC can be estimated using the change in the adequacy rates 




) − 1.    [8] 
If   𝑔𝑡(𝑝) is a decreasing function for all 𝑝, then inequality falls over time for all inequality 




comparison of the marginal distributions at the beginning and end of the time period considered. 
Therefore, we omit the issue of mobility from the evaluation of growth rates. If we want to 
consider mobility in the evaluation of growth rates, we should use the non-anonymous-NIGIC. 































































































































































































































































































































Note: Non-anonymous case: growth rate in adequacy in a state in 2006 relative to the adequacy corresponding to the 
same state in 2016. Anonymous case: growth rate in adequacy of a state ranked 𝑖 in 2006 relative to that of a state 
with the same rank 𝑖 in 2065. 
 
Figure 1 shows the Non-anonymous and the Anonymous Growth Incidence Curves for the 
adequacy rates. The figure confirms our previous conclusion that the greatest reduction in these 
rates during the period 1996-2016 was in the states which had higher adequacy rates in 1996. 
Nonetheless, the analysis in an anonymous setting shows that the highest reduction in the 
adequacy rates during the same period took place in the lower centiles. This apparent 
contradiction is due to the fact that the greatest reduction in adequacy rates were experienced by 
the states with higher initial adequacy rates, and the reduction was such that placed some of these 
states close to  the bottom of the distribution of adequacy rates at the final year  
Last, we compute distributional change indices. First, we use Silber’s (1995) measure of 
distributional change to assess inequality in growth rate. Second, following Donghde and Silber 
(2016), we estimate the index of distributional change that summarizes convergence in a non-
anonymous case, 𝐶𝑁. This index measures the degree of β-convergence across states in the 
adequacy rate −the degree to which states with lower adequacy rates increase (decrease) faster 
(slower) than states with higher adequacy rates. This methodology allows the estimation of 
measures of distributional change even when the number of observations is limited and only 
available in aggregate form. This methodology is particularly useful in the analysis at the state 
level because of the relatively small number of observations (51, from 50 states plus the District 
of Columbia). In such a case, traditional econometric approaches to convergence analysis should 




case, 𝐶𝐴, which reveals the extent of σ-convergence in adequacy rates (reduction in the 
dispersion of adequacy rates).  
Table 4. Inequality and Convergence in Adequacy Rates 
  





Non-anonymous 0.089 -0.013 
Anonymous 0.033 0.008 
1996-2000 
Non-anonymous 0.029 -0.002 
Anonymous 0.020 -0.002 
2000-2005 
Non-anonymous 0.033 -0.008 
Anonymous 0.020 -0.006 
2005-2010 
Non-anonymous 0.045 -0.009 
Anonymous 0.025 -0.001 
2010-2016 
Non-anonymous 0.024 0.002 
Anonymous 0.017 0.002 
Note: Non-anonymous case: adequacy in a state in 2006 is compared to the adequacy 
corresponding to the same state in 2016. Anonymous case: adequacy of a state ranked 𝑖 in 
2006 is compared to that of a state with the same rank 𝑖 in 2016. 
 
In general terms, we find that the estimated values of the various non-anonymous and 
anonymous indices differ in sign for the period analyzed (Table 4). As we remarked above, this 
is so because the different approaches to identification of states lead us to different conclusions. 
Along the entire period, inequality in growth rates did not show a clear tendency, displaying a 
slight upward slope in the anonymous case and a clear upward slope in the non-anonymous case, 
and in both cases there is a reduction in inequality for the last part of the period analyzed. 
The comparison of adequacy rates in 1996 and 2016 reveal a negative non-anonymous 
convergence of adequacy rates meaning that on average adequacy levels in states with greater 
initial values decreased at a higher rate than in those with low initial levels so there is 
convergence over time. Such a case corresponds to what in the literature is characterized as β-




In the anonymous case we look at the rates of growth in the various centiles. It is useful for 
assessing σ-convergence in adequacy rates. The finding that the convergence index is positive in 
the anonymous case for the overall period implies that on average the reduction in the rates were 
greater in the lower than in the higher centiles so that inequality increased (σ-divergence). 
Nonetheless, there is σ-convergence in each sub period, except in the last one.10  
In summary, the distributional convergence analysis for the entire period confirms that there was 
some kind of catching-up by states with lower benefit levels with the states with the most 
generous ones. Nevertheless, this process of rapprochement was mainly led by a general trend of 
reductions in benefits that were especially marked in the states with higher adequacy rates before 
PRWORA was enacted. This result is related to the change to a new system of block grants. As 
the Federal Government shifted from matching rates to a flat lump sum, the effective price of aid 
per dollar spent went up for those states that had higher benefits and matching rates in the 
previous regime. As different authors have stressed, it is not surprising to find a larger than 
proportional decrease in adequacy rates for those previously higher spending states (Baicker, 
2005a; Fetter, 2016). 
Therefore, the analysis supports the notion of some sort of race-to-the-bottom effect, which may 
be associated with marginal distributional social welfare losses that could reduce the gains 
involved by the improvements in labor participation and caseload numbers. Nevertheless, the 
downward convergence observed could be also caused by a variety of other factors. As 
mentioned above, PRWORA increased the marginal cost of each dollar states spend on welfare 
                                                 
10 This is known as the Simpson paradox. It refers to a phenomenon in which a clear direction emerges in individual data sets but 
disappears or reverses with aggregated data. The effect was identified by Simpson (1951), but had been mentioned earlier by 




beyond that covered by the block grants. In summary, our results, while consistent with a race-
to-the-bottom, could also come from other factors. 
6. Conditional Convergence of Adequacy Rates 
All the analyses conducted in the previous sections coincide in showing that lower adequacy 
rates, higher inequality across states, and a downward divergence path are the general outcomes 
of the reform when looking at the differences in the protection received by the most vulnerable 
households through TANF. To some extent, these results leads to assume that, as mentioned 
above, one of the consequences of welfare reform was a loss of social welfare in the terms 
mentioned above. 
However, when it comes to public policy discussions of the welfare reform enacted in 1996, 
promoting higher levels of labor participation and decreasing levels of welfare dependency were 
the main goals of the reform. In the wake of this landmark welfare reform, a widespread concern 
was strengthening work incentives and reducing TANF caseloads. These outcomes have been 
discussed thoroughly in the literature and researchers have consistently documented that welfare 
reform reduced participation in TANF program and increased employment —also driven from 
historically strong economic growth and the expansion of other benefits— and earnings of single 
mothers (Ziliak, 2016). These improvements have also led to other positive results in other 
dimensions relevant to well-being —health, child outcomes, family composition, consumption, 
savings and many other outcomes— that have been consistently summarized by different 
authors.11  
                                                 




Therefore, while adequacy rates and differences across states are a reasonable characterization of 
the reform’s outcomes, in terms of social welfare those original objectives of the reform cannot 
be ignored. To the extent that higher levels of labor participation should yield higher levels of 
social welfare, possible inferences drawn from a partial view of the whole picture should be 
viewed with skepticism. The very idea that TANF did not have an antipoverty objective it is 
hardly sustainable. The question is whether the perspective adopted to lower poverty by 
increasing self-sufficiency, employment, and two parent family formation, could affect the 
adequacy and inequality of TANF benefit levels. We want to ask whether the states where labor 
participation increased the most were also those states in which the reduction of benefit levels 
was larger. Regardless of the possible causal relationships —difficult to infer from the 
distributive approach adopted in this paper— the fact of connecting the two types of results 
broadens the possibilities for interpreting the long-term effects of the welfare reform. 
In order to get a further insight into this relationship we extend the previous analysis estimating 
convergence of adequacy ratios with respect to other variables (Donghde and Silber, 2016). This 
means that we compare the change in other outcomes with the change in adequacy rates. In this 
way, we examine whether progress in adequacy rates has been more favorable in those states 
with better outcomes in other variables. To have a broad vision of these interdependencies we 
make convergence conditional on some of the variables that have been highlighted as the most 
relevant outcomes of the reform:  
 The change in the number of hours worked by single mothers as an indicator of the 
success of the reform in terms of improving labor participation. 
 The change in poverty rates for single-mother households as a direct indicator of changes 




 The change in the relative number of TANF caseloads as an indicator of the reduction in 
welfare dependency.12 
The information on the last variable was obtained from the Office of Family Assistance and the 
USDA. The number of hours worked by single mothers was estimated using the Current 
Population Survey (CPS). Mothers were identified in the survey and single mothers were defined 
as mothers with no other parent in the household where the child lives. The number of hours 
worked is defined as the usual number of hours per week the respondent reports being at all jobs, 
over an unspecified time period. The average number of hours worked by single mother by state 
were computed using the CPS for years 1996 and 2016, and the difference was estimated. 
Poverty rates for single mothers is the proportion of single mothers that are identified as poor 
using the Official Poverty Status, a variable of the CPS constructed by IPUMS. Table 5 provides 
general support to the notion that the main objectives of the reform were achieved. On average, 
looking at the results for all states, the number of hours worked by single mothers increased by 
more than 62% between 1996 and 2016.13 Regarding welfare dependence, TANF caseloads 
decreased more than 70% in the same period. The changes in the poverty rates of single mothers 
were, however, more modest, with a reduction of 5%.  
Table 5. Convergence of Adequacy Rates Conditional to Different Variables, 1996-2016 
 
Mean change Conditional convergence 
Hours worked by single mothers 62.6 -0.0033 
Poverty rates of single mothers -5.4 -0.0255 
TANF caseloads -70.8 -0.0091 
                                                 
12 An alternative indicator could be the take-up rate in each state. It might be the case that states with low benefit levels 
decreased them but made them available to a higher share of low-income people. Estimating these rates is an undertaking that lies 
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, by looking at the caseloads we are considering this kind of relationship.  





The third column of Table 5 presents estimates of conditional convergence rates in a non-
anonymous setting. The conditioning variables are the changes in the three variables listed 
above. Several points are worth mentioning. First, the sign of the indexes of conditional 
convergence with respect to the changes in the number of hours worked by single mothers, the 
poverty rates for single mothers, and TANF caseloads are all negative. This means that there is 𝛽 
conditional convergence and the results for adequacy rates can be interpreted depending on the 
change in the mean values of the other variables in the period studied. 
Regarding the primary outcome of the reform –improving labor participation–, in general terms, 
given the small negative value of the conditional convergence measure, the states where TANF 
adequacy rates decreased more seems to be the ones in which the mean hours worked by single 
mothers increased more. Quite the opposite, in the states where the reductions in TANF 
adequacy rates were more modest the hours worked by single mothers increased less. Therefore, 
this result is in line with the fact that higher levels of labor participation were achieved in parallel 
with a reduction of benefit levels, the positive effect on social welfare levels of higher 
employment being partially offset by the reduction in the protection of the most vulnerable 
households.  
In the case of the poverty rates for single-mother households, we find that in general terms the 
states that experienced higher reductions in TANF adequacy rates were also those in which 
poverty rates decreased less. In contrast, in the states where TANF adequacy rates decreased less 
poverty rates decreased more. Not surprisingly, this result reinforces the idea of the high cost in 
terms of living standards of a strategy based on the reduction of benefit levels to reduce the 




effects of TANF on single-parent families has shrunk while those of other programs like EITC 
have remarkably increased (Ben-Shalom et al., 2012). 
A similar conclusion arises from the analysis of the interdependencies between the changes in 
the adequacy rates and the caseloads. In general terms, the states with greater reductions in 
TANF caseloads had a smaller decreases in adequacy rates, while those with lower reductions in 
the caseloads had greater reductions in adequacy rates. This result is related to the block grant 
system that caps the dollar amount of federal funds to the states regardless of increases in case 
size, shifting to the states all the costs resulting from an increasing number of recipients. Under 
the previous matching-grant system of AFDC, states only covered a fraction of additional 
spending. As stated by different authors (Stiglitz and Rosengard, 2015; Ziliak, 2016), the 50 
percent matching rate had effectively lowered the “price” of welfare, and under TANF this price 
is higher. Higher caseloads imply that the cost of a dollar increase in the benefit level is greater. 
If the states want to maintain the level of spending around a certain level, they may choose 
between reducing TANF benefit levels or reducing caseloads. In practice, some studies found 
that the substantial changes implemented in welfare programs in the US caused a decrease in the 
cyclicality of cash welfare (Bitler and Hoynes, 2010; Loprest, 2012), confirming the importance 
of the price effect. The lack of cyclical response of TANF is likely attributable to the block-
grants received by the states, that are fixed in nominal terms each year regardless of 
macroeconomic conditions (Bitler and Hoynes, 2016b). 
It could be argued that with higher labor force participation, more income is earned and therefore 
TANF benefits could be less needed. However, in practice, the available data show that the 
coverage of vulnerable households did drop to low new levels in most states. In 12 states, 10 or 




30 or more families receive cash assistance from every 100 families in poverty (Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities, 2016). When TANF was enacted, nationally, 68 families received 
assistance for every 100 families in poverty; that number has since then fallen to just 23 families 
receiving assistance for every 100 families in poverty. Sherman and Trisi (2015) found that 
while in 1995 AFDC removed 2.4 million children from deep poverty —having income below 
50 percent of the poverty line— in 2010, TANF removed 600,000 children. There is growing 
empirical evidence showing that the most economically disadvantaged families have been less 
protected by the safety net over time (Bitler and Hoynes, 2016a; Hardy, 2016). 
Therefore, against the well-established gains of higher levels of labor participation and 
decreasing levels of welfare dependency, a fair assessment of the effects of the 1996 reform must 
take into account the lower adequacy rates and higher inequality of benefits across states that 
followed the assignment of greater responsibilities to the states.  
7. Conclusion 
The increased ability of states to set TANF benefit levels and eligibility conditions as a result of 
the welfare reform that was enacted in 1996 has attracted great attention from researchers and 
policymakers. While changes in labor participation rates and increases in self-sufficiency or less 
transfer dependency –the stated main objectives of the reform– have been the subject of much 
attention in the literature, there has been much less attention paid to what the costs of that reform 
may have been. This latter research is needed to provide a more balanced assessment of the 
impact of the reform in terms of distributional costs. The past two decades have witnessed an 
intense debate over the long-term effects of the reforms on the under-provision of welfare 
benefits and the likely ‘race to the bottom’ process that would accompany the reform with lower 




the existence of a ‘race to the bottom’ effect and a general reduction in TANF levels, after many 
years of research, until now we have had relatively little insight into what have been the potential 
distributional costs of PRWORA.  
The potential effects of the 1996 devolution process on inequality across states raise numerous 
interesting questions. In this paper, we have focused more narrowly on the measurement of these 
inequalities across time using a distributional approach. By considering alternative distributive 
approaches to identify the different avenues through which inequality in states’ benefits could 
have increased, this paper contributes to the development of a more comprehensive picture of the 
long-term results of the1996 reform.  
According to our results, the purchasing value of most benefits has fallen drastically since 
PRWORA was enacted, with the amount of cash assistance declining both in inflation-adjusted 
terms and as a proportion of the federal poverty line in almost every state. As a result, the 
capacity of the programs to alleviate poverty has been severely limited and extreme poverty is 
more cyclical now in the U.S. than in past recessions. During the last two decades, differences in 
benefit levels between the higher and lower generous states have been very large. Furthermore, 
with the exception of the upper and lower tails of the states’ distribution the corresponding 
rankings of benefit levels have not been constant. Additionally, the reduction of benefit levels 
has been remarkably larger in the states with prior higher benefits than in those with prior lower 
ones. Despite this distribution of the reduction in adequacy rates, we find that welfare reform 
increased inequality in adequacy rates across states at the same time that the amounts received by 
poor households were reduced.  
One contribution of the paper has been to identify the precise effect of each state’s reform on 




not stable along the different time periods, it is clear that some states increased their 
contributions to inequality between 1996 and 2016 (Washington and Rhode Island) –with a great 
distance with respect to the most generous states– while the opposite occurred in other states 
because of the positive growth in their adequacy rates (New York, Wyoming and Maryland).  
In general terms, almost all the states experienced a reduction in their adequacy rates that can be 
termed as being pro-poor, as in the states with lower adequacy rates in the mid-nineties 
reductions were lower than in the rest of the states. However, changes in the position of each 
state in the distribution of adequacy rates (re-rankings) made overall inequality to increase. 
Last, another finding from our distributional approach is to confirm that devolution can be 
associated with a ‘race to the bottom’ effect among states in the longer term. The distributional 
convergence analysis shows that the states with lower benefits at the beginning of the devolution 
period had smaller reductions in benefit levels while the states with largest benefits at the 
beginning had the largest reductions in benefits. The results show that there is downward 
anonymous divergence, meaning that  on average the reduction in the rates were greater in the 
lower, rather  than in the higher, centiles causing inequality to increase..  
In short, the assessment in distributional terms of the system that devolved to the states more 
capacity to select among policy parameters is a negative one. Yet knowing that the major 
objective of the reform was to foster transitions from welfare to work, the increased capacity of 
states to achieve this goal also had significant negative distributive impacts: lower adequacy 
rates, higher inequality across states, and a downward divergence path. All these lead us to 
conclude that the PRWORA reform of 1996 yielded some distributional costs, which one would 




dependence. To this point, there has been little recognition of those costs in the overall 
assessment of the success of the PRWORA reform.  
In sum, our results show that the achievement of the main outcomes was not neutral. The states 
where TANF adequacy rates decreased more were also the ones in which the hours worked by 
single mothers increased more and reductions in poverty for these households were less. In other 
words, the welfare gains from the higher labor participation coincided with a reduction in the 
intensity of protection, although partially offset by the improvement in other benefits. It is 
possible that in order to improve labor incentives, the reduction of benefit levels may have been 
inevitable, but these policies had important distributional consequences that must be taken into 
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Alabama 161 151 176 155 143 -11.25 
Alaska 903 832 731 654 597 -33.87 
Arizona 339 313 275 197 179 -47.15 
Arkansas 200 188 167 147 136 -32.30 
California 606 636 622 535 484 -20.14 
Colorado 349 321 282 327 299 -14.38 
Connecticut 532 496 429 394 381 -28.31 
Delaware 332 311 276 263 225 -32.30 
D.C. 384 349 317 309 289 -24.85 
Florida 297 279 247 219 201 -32.30 
Georgia 275 258 229 202 186 -32.30 
Hawaii 605 514 451 438 395 -34.77 
Idaho 284 259 245 219 200 -29.53 
Illinois 369 344 322 316 293 -20.50 
Indiana 282 263 234 211 196 -30.62 
Iowa 417 388 347 312 289 -30.62 
Kansas 420 391 349 314 291 -30.62 
Kentucky 257 241 214 189 174 -32.30 
Louisiana 187 205 196 173 160 -14.49 
Maine 409 421 383 338 313 -23.44 
Maryland 372 385 394 415 420 12.81 
Massachusetts 567 553 488 431 406 -28.44 
Michigan 449 418 382 360 334 -25.63 
Minnesota 521 485 433 390 361 -30.62 
Mississippi 118 157 139 123 113 -4.10 
Missouri 286 266 238 214 198 -30.62 
Montana 428 432 314 357 363 -15.21 
Nebraska 411 385 296 267 263 -35.91 
Nevada 340 314 276 271 248 -27.22 
New Hampshire 539 533 493 471 436 -19.02 
New Jersey 415 388 335 296 274 -34.02 
New Mexico 413 397 308 301 252 -38.92 
New York 565 528 545 525 510 -9.78 




Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
  
North Dakota 430 423 388 338 328 -23.75 
Ohio 341 337 313 318 319 -6.19 
Oklahoma 297 269 238 211 194 -34.56 
Oregon 478 453 401 366 327 -31.48 
Pennsylvania 395 368 318 281 260 -34.02 
Rhode Island 543 507 437 386 358 -34.02 
South Carolina 197 186 186 183 185 -6.17 
South Dakota 421 392 412 403 410 -2.49 
Tennessee 182 170 151 134 123 -32.30 
Texas 185 181 180 185 187 1.18 
Utah 425 413 375 347 322 -24.15 
Vermont 594 571 505 446 414 -30.30 
Virginia 286 286 261 231 248 -13.33 
Washington 534 492 432 379 328 -38.66 
West Virginia 248 339 309 246 226 -9.03 
Wisconsin 607 614 548 493 444 -26.95 




Table A2. Growth in Mean Adequacy Rates, Change in Inequality, Progressivity and Re-
rankings for Different Parameter Values  
 




-0.2554 -0.0352 -0.0970 -0.0855 -0.0655 
𝛼 =1.5 
∆G 0.0042 0.0002 0.0033 -0.0010 0.0017 
V 0.0093 0.0013 -0.0006 0.0058 -0.0008 
R 0.0135 0.0015 0.0027 0.0048 0.0009 
𝛼 =2 
∆G 0.0060 -0.0012 0.0029 0.0015 0.0028 
V 0.0143 0.0040 0.0009 0.0068 -0.0017 
R 0.0202 0.0028 0.0038 0.0082 0.0010 
𝛼 =2.5 
∆G 0.0061 -0.0029 0.0012 0.0045 0.0033 
V 0.0178 0.0069 0.0030 0.0061 -0.0022 
R 0.0239 0.0040 0.0043 0.0106 0.0011 
𝛼=3 
∆G 0.0052 -0.0046 -0.0009 0.0071 0.0035 
V 0.0203 0.0098 0.0053 0.0048 -0.0024 
R 0.0255 0.0052 0.0044 0.0119 0.0012 
𝛼=3.5 
∆G 0.0036 -0.0061 -0.0030 0.0093 0.0035 
V 0.0224 0.0123 0.0075 0.0031 -0.0023 
R 0.0260 0.0062 0.0044 0.0124 0.0012 
𝛼=4 
∆G 0.0017 -0.0075 -0.0051 0.0110 0.0033 
V 0.0241 0.0147 0.0095 0.0015 -0.0022 








Figure A1. Changes in TANF adequacy levels 1996-2016 against changes in the number of 
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